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This research paper examines the role of the Orientalist and 
Balkanist discourse in the Former Yugoslavia with a particular 
focus on Albanians. Here, Western Orientalist and Balkanist 
stereotypes of the Former Yugoslavia are examined arguing 
that the Orientalism and Balkanism of people living in the 
Former Yugoslavia is and was viewed differently from the 
standard by the West and by the people living in the Former 
Yugoslavia in the way how they perceive each other. The first 
part of this research paper treats the Orientalism and 
Balkanism in the context of people living in the Former 
Yugoslavia, in general.  
The second part of this research paper analyzes the case 
study of the application of the Orientalist and Balkanist 
theoretical lenses on one of the nations living in the Former 
Yugoslavia, namely Albanians. Here, some explorations and 
thoughts are provided on how Albanians define themselves 
and how they were perceived by the South Slavic majority 
living in the Former Yugoslavia.  
There are three authors and, subsequently, three seminal 
works that shall serve as pillars of this theoretical analysis: 
concepts of Edward Said’s “Orientalism,” Bakic-Hayden’s 
theories on Orientalist variations and nesting Orientalism, and 
Maria Todorova’s ground-breaking analysis of the external 
practices of Balkans representation. These provide a useful 
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theoretical framework through which to explore the distribution of the 
Orientalist and Balkanist discourses in Former Yugoslavia. 
 





The role of the Orientalist and Balkanist discourses in Former 
Yugoslavia produced Western stereotypes. The Orientalist and Balkanist 
expositions of this region also shaped variety of discourses among 
communities living in the Former Yugoslavia, particularly due to diverse 
histories and specifics of each nation. 
It is shown here that a uniform interpretation of Orientalism and 
Balkanism in the context of Former Yugoslavia cannot be made. This 
research paper highlights the multilayered and polyphonic character of 
Orientalism reflected in how the people living in the Former Yugoslavia 
viewed themselves, were viewed externally by other people in the Former 
Yugoslavia, and were viewed by the West. Applying Orientalist and 
Balkanist theoretical lenses on Albanians living in the Former Yugoslavia, 
this research paper explores and provides some thoughts on how 
Albanians defined themselves, how they were perceived by the South 
Slavic majority within the Former Yugoslavia, and why Albanians 
considered their nationality as the utmost important to define themselves, 
unlike the other people living in the Former Yugoslavia who used religion 




Orient is a label that designates the East in contrast to the 
Occident, which refers to the West, while Orientalism, as a concept, is often 
used as an analytical term on how the East is seen by the West. Since the 
18th century, Orientalism has been used as a traditional term for Oriental 
Studies, even though the Oxford English Dictionary cites only one such 
usage which originates from the famous poet and traveler, Lord Byron, in 
1812 (Pearsall & Hanks, 2001). The Palestinian-American scholar Edward 
Said redefined this term forever in 1978 in his influential and provocative 
book “Orientalism” (Said, 1977). According to Said, Orientalism indicates 
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several things and it could be argued that all of them are interdependent. 
Through a philosophical analysis, Said positions the West’s insincere 
perceptions of “the Orient” as “the other,” different, unusual, fanatical, 
violent, religious, and inferior. By analyzing the Western attitudes towards 
the East, Said considers Orientalism as a powerful European ideological 
creation, and a way for writers, philosophers, and colonial administrators 
to deal with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs (Said, 
1977; 149). Said pictures West’s tendency to deal with the East through a 
generalized and systematic vocabulary that is used to describe the Orient as 
unchanging and uniform and as something that the West should fear. He 
analyzes European and American observations of the Arab and Islamic 
culture and general dichotomous attributions these two are trying to 
ascribe to the East: barbarism vs. civilization, Western progress behind “us” 
versus “them”, or Christianity and civilization vs. primitivism and Islam.  
The variations (modalities) of Orientalist discourses that are produced as 
a result of different histories and events create distinctions in how the Old 
World (Britain and France) or, lately, the US, view the Orient. For example, 
Said argues that the difference between Britain and France, on one hand, 
and the USA, on the other, with respect to Orientalism lies in the fact that 
Britain and France had colonies in the Orient, which implies their 
longstanding relationship and imperial roles in places such as India and 
Algeria, to name just the two, while the USA experienced much less direct 
contact with the Orient, because there has never been a USA occupation of 
that part of the world at the time Said wrote “Orientalism.” Said argues 
that the USA has had much more indirect contact with the Orient that is 
based on abstract sentiments. These sentiments are also very politicized by 
Israel, as the USA’s ally, so much so that it could be said that Israel’s rivalry 
with the Palestinians and Arabs was imported in the USA after the creation 
of Israel. The modern USA is prone to exaggerating differences between 
modern Americans and modern Arabs and downplaying its economic 
interest from certain Arabic countries.  
Orientalism also addresses universal clichés of human nature involving 
power and discourse that resonate beyond the broader “East-West” 
divisions. By dismantling West’s tendency to present itself as rational, 
developed, humane, and superior while presenting the Orient as 
underdeveloped, aberrant and inferior, Said maintains that the Orient 
appeared as “the other” in the Western descriptions for the purpose of its 
domination. In that, Said maintains that abstracts are always preferred to 
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direct evidence that Orientals cannot be trusted because “of liberty, they 
know nothing; of propriety, they have none: force is their god” 
(Chateaubriand quoted in Said’s “Orientalism”).  
Said advances three major visions of the Orientalist view:  
1. Orientalism served certain political needs although claiming to be 
neutral, objective and rather mysterious;  
2. Orientalism helped define a European, mainly English and French, 
self-image;  
3. Orientalism has produced a false description of the Arabs and the 
Islamic culture (Said, 1977; 36).  
 
Said concludes that in an Orientalist framework of thought, the Orient 
does not develop, but remains the same. Although this could be 
understood as a romantic statement, this is one of the main evils of the 
Orientalist framework of mind, because it creates an image outside of 
history, something placid and eternal which contradicts the history and 
creates a sense of the ideal “other” (Said, 1977; 201, 326), but condemning it 
to always remain frozen in time, unchanged, denying it of any progress.  
Said’s “Orientalism” is resistant to time because it also provides 
valuable information about the ongoing forms of Orientalism.1 Said accuses 
the West that it wants to keep the idea of the Islam and the East as a threat 
to the West, even today. He asserts that the demonization of Islam in the 
news and popular culture present the today’s tool for further colonization 
of the Orient. He highlights the role journalists and Hollywood have 
played in creating an impression that the main purpose of Islam is to 
threaten and kill the Westerners, and that the main purpose of Arabs is to 
keep one whole region in a state of perpetual clench.2 At the same time, 
Said blames the Arabs for allowing themselves to be represented as the 
objects of Orientalism. The Arab lack of capability to reach a consensus on 
establishment of information policies to offer a real and different image of 
them and their world is due to the fact that some Arab countries are 
                                                 
1 Latest example of modern American Orientalism:  
http://www.barenakedislam.com/2014/04/27/texas-cair-in-an-uproar-again-over-
another-republican-warning-of-stealth-jihad-by-muslims-in-america/ [Last accessed on 
07/05/2015] 
2 The Hollywood image of Arabs and Arab causes: 
http://1989nineteeneightynine.wordpress.com/2013/04/01/orientalism-in-lawrence-of-
arabia/ [Last accessed on 07/05/2015]  
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dictatorships influenced from the West, in one way or another, and are not 
ready to stand against them.  
 
3. Connections between the Orientalism and the Balkanism with the 
Balkans 
 
Said’s theories on Orientalism are also useful for understanding the 
importance of how the West imagines the Balkans. According to Said, 
“often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even 
historically innocent” (Said, 1977; 36). However, a scrutiny of the 20th 
century travel journals reveals them to be politically and racially charged: 
Servia, with mountains and inaccessible forests, is an ideal refuge for 
outlaws; and whole regiments may pursue a handful for weeks through 
pathless tracts in vain. During Turkish times the hajdutsi were deemed 
patriots by the Servians, many of them having been outlawed for 
insurrectionary acts. There is a large coffee-house in Belgrade dedicated to 
one of these historical hajdutsi. Anyone who spent his life in harassing the 
Turks had a claim upon their sympathy. But since the political 
emancipation hajdutsi have grown rarer and rarer, and it is a frequent 
complain that common criminals should usurp the old honoured title. […] 
Very often they will salve their consciences by giving money to churches, 
or by helping their poorer neighbours in the approved Robin Hood fashion 
(Vivian, 1904; 272). 
In the eyes of the writing West, the long period of Ottoman rule 
unquestionably tainted the Balkan peninsula, thus causing its irrevocable 
reversion to primitivism. The binary lens through which travelers wrote 
constantly juxtaposed the culture and the people of the Balkans to the 
accepted civilized normality of the West (Kelley, 2012; 8). Likewise, Said’s 
theory on the “domination tendencies” (Said, 1977; 25), could be applied to 
understand Western Europe’s tendency to be presented as rational, 
developed, humane, and superior while presenting those considered 
“others” as underdeveloped, aberrant, and inferior.  
Balkan is not only a geographical term, but a term that entails strong 
political and ideological connotations. However, in its proper geographic 
definition, Balkan refers to the peninsula that was formerly ruled almost 
entirely by the Ottoman Empire (Colin and Sloan, 2014; 115). Building on 
Said’s concept of Orientalism, Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden 
consider that the Balkans can be viewed as a variation of the Orientalist 
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theme that distinguishes this region as a part of Europe which used to be 
under the Ottoman rule (M. Bakic-Hayden & R. Hayden 1992). Milica Bakic-
Hayden also uses the term “nesting Orientalism” (1995) and by introducing 
the idea of “nesting,” she tends to dismantle a likeliness of each region to 
view the cultures and religions to their East as more conservative and 
primitive (M. Bakic-Hayden, 1995; 917). She argues that identities become 
fluid and overlapping in the process of nesting, while ethnic, national, 
religious, or gender identities could shift or become fixed, but are 
nonetheless changing. In her theory, she also explains how a group that 
creates the Orientalized “other” can also be the subject of Orientalization by 
a different group. According to this concept, Asia is more “East” or more 
“other” than Eastern Europe and, within Eastern Europe, the Balkans are 
perceived as most “Eastern.” Such hierarchy also exists within the Balkans. 
For example, Yugoslavs who reside in areas that were formerly the 
Habsburg monarchy distinguish themselves as more European from the 
Eastern Orthodox people who also perceive themselves as more European 
than those who assumed identities of European Muslims and who further 
distinguish themselves from the ultimate Orientals, non-Europeans (M. 
Bakic-Hayden, 1995; 922). 
On the other hand, Maria Todorova, the founding figure of Balkanism,3 
in her historical analysis challenges Bakic-Hayden’s argument and insists 
that Balkanism is an altogether different discourse and that this part of 
Europe does not present an Orientalist variation (Todorova, 1994; 454, 455). 
She is convincingly showing historical facts that Balkanism cannot be 
considered as a sub-species of Orientalism, because the concept evolved 
independently from Orientalism, and is strongly motivated from 
aggressive and passionate nationalism, not religion. Even though, 
Todorova claims that Balkan’s inconsistent (but usually negative) image 
inside Western culture impacts the paradoxes of cultural reference and its 
assumptions, still, she argues that the Balkans form a part of Europe, albeit 
a provincial or peripheral part for the last several centuries. Balkanism, 
according to Todorova, treats the differences within one type, Europe, 
rather than the difference between imputed types (the “Occident” and the 
“Orient”).  
                                                 
3 Maria Todorova developed a theory of Balkanism or nesting Balkanisms. She argues that 
“there is a discourse, which I term Balkanism, that creates a stereotype of the Balkans, and 
politics is significantly and organically intertwined with this discourse.” 
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Todorova highlights that the name Balkan was used for the very first 
time in 1784,4 earlier than the concept of Orientalism, and that this territory 
was previously referred to as Haemus, Hellenic, Greek, Illyrian, Roman 
and Byzantine Peninsula, as well as Thrace and Rumelia. Todorova argues 
that it is the barbarism and the violence of the Balkans that were reported 
by all the travelers5 that provided the negative image of the area. In 
addition, she reminds that Western Europe did not colonize the Balkans 
and, thus, the area does not belong under the same Orientalist umbrella 
with the countries they did colonize. She considers that the Balkan was 
influenced by political Romanticism6 and Evolutionism7 that appeared at 
the beginning of the 20th century. Todorova traces the genealogy of 
Balkanism through the travel writings of Western authors to explore how 
the term Balkan has been negatively constructed over the past three 
centuries. The long-ruling history of the Ottomans in the Balkans can be 
seen as a continuation of Orientalism, but it can also be seen as a center of 
violent home-grown nationalistic clashes, as the West views it.  
Despite the definite link between theoretical Orientalism and the 
Balkanism, the manipulation of the area’s history, geography, and culture 
                                                 
4 The term Balkan was used the first time by John Morritt in 1784 when discussing the 
Dinaric Alps which means that it is used earlier than the term Orientalism that Lord 
Byron used in 1812. 
5 Todorova in her analysis used the writings of several travelers (see, Todorova, 94; 462) of 
which here are mentioned only three, including: John B. S. Morritt of Rokeby, A Grand 
Tour. Letters and Journeys 1794-96, ed. G. E. Marindin (London: Century Publishing, 
1985), John Burbury Gent, A Relation of a journey of the Right Honourable My Lord 
Henry Howard, From London to Vienna, and thence to Constantinople; In the Company 
of his Excellency Count Lesley, Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, Councellor of 
State to his Imperial Majesty,etc. 
6 Romanticism is a 18th and 19th century art and literature movement that was created as a 
revolt against the Neoclassicism of the previous centuries. The German poet Friedrich 
Schlegel, who is given credit for first using the term romantic to describe literature, defined 
it as “literature depicting emotional matter in an imaginative form.” Source of 
information; Cuddon, J.A. The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory. 
Third Ed. London: Penguin Books, 1991, available at;  
http://www.uh.edu/engines/romanticism/introduction.html [Last accessed on  
07/05/2015]  
7 Evolutionism was a widely held 19th century belief that organisms are intrinsically likely, 
over time, to increase in complexity through evolution. The belief was extended to include 
cultural evolution and social evolution. Source of information; ZME Science posts about 
evolutionism, available at; http://www.zmescience.com/tag/evolutionism/ [Last 
accessed on 07/05/2015] 
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are currently experiencing a different phenomenon. While some scholars 
question the Orientalist approach to Balkans, the accepted Eurocentric 
perspective continues to color historical interpretation of the area. 
Todorova sheds a clear light on the main difference between Said’s theory 
of Orientalism and her theory of Balkanism: Geographically inextricable 
from Europe, yet culturally constructed as “the other,” the Balkans became, 
in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and 
cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative 
characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of 
the “European” and “the West” has been constructed. Balkanism 
conveniently exempted “the West” from charges of racism, colonialism, 
Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance: the Balkans, after all, are in 
Europe, they are caucasian and they are predominantly Christian (Todorova 
1994; 456). 
Todorova also argues that while Orientalism is a “discourse about an 
imputed opposition,” Balkanism is a “discourse about an imputed 
ambiguity” (Todorova 2004; 17). By notifying that the Balkans and Russia 
were viewed, if not strictly Asian than semi-Asian and “other” Europe even 
after the 1970s, she concludes that Balkan was always paired in opposition 
to the “West” and “Europe,” whereas Balkanization was viewed as the 
“dark other” of the Western civilization. Presently, Balkanization has come 
to signify the general disintegration of viable nation-states and the 
reversion to “the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian” 
(Todorova, 2004; 3). 
The importance of Balkanism as a concept was also emphasized in 
identity constructions. In the case of the Balkans, the identity constructions 
involve the dual perception of the Balkans as a part of Europe, but also its 
opposition and its “darker side.” Thus, according to Todorova, Balkanism 
evolved independently from Orientalism and, in certain aspects, against or 
despite it, and that, partially, because the Southeastern Europe has been 
considered geopolitically distinct from the Near or the Middle East 
(Todorova, 2004; 20).  
The position of this research paper is that the perception or the 
treatment of the Balkans as the “other” is also based on the Balkan’s 
proximity to the East and its influence on the region: the territory of 
Balkans is a borderland between the East and the West, the Occident and 
the Orient. Similarly to the Orient, Balkans was also viewed critically by the 
West. Such approach was present since the 18th century. Todorova 
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documented the presence of the Western missionaries traveling in the 
Balkans which was ruled by the Ottoman Empire at that time, with the 
purpose of forming negative opinions about the Orient and the Balkans, 
mainly due to religious reasons (Todorova, 1994; 470).  
As stated previously, although the origins of the modern usage of the 
term Balkan were simply to signify a geographic place name, Balkan no 
longer functions as such. Instead, the name of the region has taken on an 
extremely negative and even racist meaning. Madgearu defines Balkanism 
as “a permanent state of cold or warm conflict between neighboring 
countries for territories with mixed populations” (Madgearu, 2008; 3). 
According to Madgearu, although the Balkan Peninsula is often referred to 
as the “powder keg of Europe,” it would be more accurate to refer to it as 
the “melting pot of Europe.” With the dissolution of any strong outside 
force dominating the area, the Balkan states, prompted by political 
propaganda and nationalist ideologies, used history to support their 
territorial claims, defend ethnic cleansing, and justify conflicts with other 
countries (Madgearu, 2008; 3). The Balkans, despite its geographical position 
in Europe, became Europe’s shadow, or the dark side within. These Balkan 
stereotypes were reinvigorated by the recent wars in the Former 
Yugoslavia which were often termed Balkan Wars despite the fact they 
were confined to the former Yugoslav republics and despite the fact that 
the term has been traditionally used solely to describe the 1912-1913 war 
between the four Balkan countries (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and 
Serbia) and the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First World War. 
Nevertheless, both Todorova and Bakic-Hayden agree about the 
Balkan’s perceived “otherness” in the Western eyes, although one argues 
that it is motivated by aggressive and passionate nationalism (Todorova, 
1994) while the other stresses that the religion impacted further division 
between the East (Orthodox churches and Islam) and the West (Catholic 
and Protestant churches) (M. Bakic-Hayden & R. Hayden 1992). Bakic-
Hayden insists that, due to their religious backgrounds, even the 
communities living within this area were perceived by each other as 
“other” or “European.” When narrowing the focus further to only one part 
of the Balkans, namely Yugoslavia, it becomes clear that areas populated by 
majority of inhabitants belonging to the Catholic religion who resided in 
the former Habsburg monarchy perceived themselves as different or 
“European” when compared to the other areas formerly ruled by the 
Ottoman Empire. In addition, Bakic-Hayden analyzed how the Orthodox 
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community perceived themselves as more European in comparison to those 
that assumed the identity of European Muslims (Bosnians). After these 
analyses, Bakic-Hayden concluded that while Slovenes and Croats used 
their Catholic religion and former affiliation to the Habsburg Empire to 
reach their European aspirations, the advantages of belonging to the 
Ottoman Empire did not matter at all, particularly for the Muslims (M. 
Bakic-Hayden & R. Hayden, 1992; 923). The Northwest stresses the European 
character and apparent advantages of once being a part of the Hapsburg 
Empire, while their Ottoman heritage is blamed for the ills of the rest of the 
country.  
Historian Patrick Hyder Patterson highlighted debates of the Slovene 
elites, particularly during the Yugoslav breakup between 1980 and 1990. 
Although these debates were ongoing domestically they, ultimately, aimed 
at foreign audiences, to highlight Slovenia and its culture as belonging to 
the “West,” “Central Europe” and “Europe,” but never to the “Balkans” 
(Patterson, 2003; 110). Patterson claims that Slovenia managed to gain a 
Central European identity quite rapidly in the eyes of its first European 
neighbors (Austria and Italy). He further explains the ways in which 
Slovenia frequently portrayed the Balkans as a region sinking in disorder, 
violence, mismanagement, and authoritarianism, while considering Eastern 
Europe as a stable, orderly, civilized, and democratic. Patterson highlights 
it is made clear that while Slovenes clamored for recognition as real 
Europeans, they expressed their tendency to Orientalize the rest of the 
Balkans. However, Slovenia, concludes Patterson, managed to affirm an 
identity granted in traditions and understood to be Europe, not Balkan 
(Patterson, 2003; 114). Even the foremost critic of the Balkanist discourse, 
Maria Todorova, expressly excludes the Slovenes from her roster of the 
Balkan people, reasoning that they do not share the “concrete historical 
existence” common to the Balkans: the Ottoman legacy (Todorova 2004; 12-
13, 31).  
Nevertheless, the Croatians are included in her list alongside Albanians, 
Bulgarians, Greeks, Romanians, Turks, and other former Yugoslavs and 
that is because of the lengthy Ottoman rule over entire or some of their 
lands. However, similarly to Slovenia, when Croatia seceded from the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatians were optimistic 
that their newfound independence would accomplish two things: Croatia 
would be recognized as a sovereign state for the first time in its national 
history, and it would “return” to its rightful place in Europe (Razsa and 
Orientalism, Balkanism and the Western Viewpoint in the Context of Former Yugoslavia 
 
_____________________________ 
Iliria International Review – 2015/1 
© Felix–Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 
321 
Lindstrom, 2004; 628, 629). Thus, “returning” to Europe was as important as 
sovereignty. However, all other Yugoslav nations also wanted to be seen as 
European as possible. This is why they distanced themselves from 
“Orientalism” as well as “Balkanism,” and are prone to finding their 
national identity roots in pre-Yugoslav and pre-Ottoman times: Bosnians 
press on their Bosnian Church and are fiercely proud to have been 
considered heretics by the mainstream Christianity of the time, while 
Serbians and Bulgarians seem to be equally proud of gaining independence 
from the mainstream Orthodox Church which was, at the time, seated in 
Constantinople which fell under the Ottomans. It is clear that the religious 
background was used as the most important tool for gaining Western and 
European identity by most of the people in the Former Yugoslavia. In this, 
the only exception were Albanians. According to Bakic-Hayden, the 
religion did not impact Albanian strong sense of national and “non-Slavic” 
identity (M. Bakic-Hayden, 1995; 925, 926). 
These processes of inclusion and, particularly, of exclusion are central to 
the redefinition of Yugoslavia. A great deal of political rhetoric, particularly 
since the late 1980s revolved around constructions that claimed a 
privileged “European” status for some groups in the country while 
condemning others as “Balkan” or “Byzantine,” hence non-European and 
“other.” This Orientalist dichotomy is embodied in distinctions between 
the “Northern” and the “Southern” republics in a delineation that, 
strangely enough, can also be expressed equivalently as between 
“Western” and “Eastern” republics. These are not culturally or politically 
neutral distinctions. They privilege the predominantly Catholic, former 
Hapsburg territories of Slovenia and Croatia over the predominantly 
Orthodox or Muslim, former Ottoman territories of the rest of the country 
(M. Bakic-Hayden & R. Hayden, 1992). Hayden emphasizes the difference in 
historical terminology between the East and West, now in the context of 
Yugoslavia: Defining the Western parts of Yugoslavia as different from the 
Southeastern parts: more progressive, prosperous, hard-working, tolerant, 
democratic… in a word, European, compared to the primitive, lazy, 
intolerant Balkans. Were this characterization to become accepted, it would 
be clear, first, that Yugoslavia was an impossible union of parts not only 
disparate, but completely incompatible; and second, that the Northwestern 
parts of the country were really parts of Europe, artificially separated by 
their imprisonment in the Balkans (M. Bakic-Hayden & R. Hayden 1992; 8). 
However, several scholars insist to examine critically how a geographically 
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and historically defined place, the Balkans, has become a symbol imbued 
with a host of derogatory meanings.8 There are many rankings connected 
with this concept that play a significant role in different people’s identity 
building, as well as proclaiming a more prestigious position within a 
general negatively assessed entity. The idea of “nesting Orientalisms” in 
Bakic-Hayden (1995) and the related concept of “nesting Balkanism” in 
Todorova (1997) are still contradictory to each other. The dynamic nature of 
“Europe” and “the Balkans” is even more relevant when the two are 
regarded as identity constructions. However, the fact that Bakic-Hayden’s 
concept came out during the time when everything in Yugoslavia was 
evidently falling apart, had shaped and affected her main argument. It is 
also evident that the Haydens were against the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
and the way the independence of states was operationalized. Despite 
challenges to the “Orientalist” or “Balkanist” discourse of the region, the 
last 20 years of scholarship on Former Yugoslavia and its successor states 
have undergone significant shifts, not least of which has been the 
introduction of new theoretical positions and paradigms.  
 
4. Application of the Orientalist and Balkanist Theoretical Lenses to 
Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia 
 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic Albanians lived mainly in Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Southeastern Serbia and Montenegro. Due to the lengthy Ottoman rule 
over some of the lands they inhabited, Albanians are also included in Maria 
Todorova’s list of the Balkanism where she argues that “it is preposterous 
to look for an Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. The Balkans are the Ottoman 
legacy” (Todorova 2004; 83, 161). In addition to Todorova’s illustration, the 
main way in which the Balkanism has been internalized among Albanians 
living in the Yugoslavia also includes internal differentiation based on 
imputed Balkan characteristics or that what Bakic-Hayden describes as 
“nesting Orientalisms”.  
                                                 
8 Other works in this tradition include Dušan Bjelić and Obrad Savić, Balkan as Metaphor 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); K. E. Fleming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan 
Historiography,’ American Historical Review 105:4 (2000): 1218-33; Patrick Hyder Patterson, 
‘On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovene, Austrian, and Italian 
Discourse,’ Slavic Review 62:1 (Spring 2003): 110-41; Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing 
Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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Although most of the people of the former Yugoslavia used their 
religion as the most important tool to acquire Western and European 
identities and thus break free from their Ottoman past and from each other, 
Albanians were exception. According to Bakic-Hayden, the religion did not 
impact Albanian strong sense of national and “non-Slavic” identity (M. 
Bakic-Hayden, 1995; 925, 926). Therefore, it was Albanian nationalism – 
based on language, ethnicity and territory, rather than religion - 
propagated by the Albanian elites which unified ideologically both the 
country and its other territories. 
 
4.1. How Albanians Defined their Self 
Being perceived as an Orientalist and a Balkanist or as non-Western 
society, similarly to most other national elites in the Balkans, Albanian 
nationalist elites also required their community to resemble their Western 
counterparts that were considered as the source of reference for 
“modernization” and “progress,” during the processes of modernization in 
the 18th and the 19th century (Todorova, 1997). Dukagjin Gorani in his PhD 
thesis argues that the process of “Westernization” of these societies entailed 
the simultaneous exercise of their “de-orientalisation.” In other words, 
one’s “Westernness” could have only been measured through one’s “non-
easternness.” He argues that this conforms to the history of ideological 
narratives that established and shaped the ethnonational identity of 
Albanians in the Balkans. Specifically, Gorani considers that the analysis of 
effects of the Orientalist discourse is relevant in studying the 
epistemological landscape that conditioned the formation of the national 
identity and ideology in the non-Western societies (Gorani, 2011, 77). 
As most of the nations in the Balkans, Albanians embarked on a quest 
for their pre-Christian lineage that, in their case, was constructed as being 
Illyrian. As a first element towards their “modernization,” thus seeking to 
“look different” from the other populations in the Balkans and, obviously, 
“non-Slavic,” Albanians started viewing themselves as descendants of 
Illyrians. Even nowadays modern Albanians claim Illyrian heritage as part 
of their shared heritage.9 Wilkes book “The Illyrians” is one of the few 
books in English which focuses solely on these ancient people and their 
province. As such, it carries a lot of weight, but also a lot of problems and 
                                                 
9 The theory that Albanians were related to the Illyrians was proposed for the first time by 
the Swedish historian Johann Erich Thunmann in 1774. The scholars who advocate an 
Illyrian origin are numerous. 
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disputed historical conclusions (Wilkes, 1995). There are historians, such as 
John V.A. Fine who concluded that the Albanians are descendants of 
populations of the prehistoric Balkans, such as the Illyrians (Fine 1991; 10), 
whereas studies in genetic anthropology show that the Albanians share the 
same ancestry as most other European peoples (Belledi, S. Poloni, Casalotti, 
Conterio, Mikerezi, Tagliavini and Excoffier, 2000).10 However, very little 
evidence of pre-Christian Albanian culture survived, although their 
mythology and folklore are of Paleo-Balkanic origin and almost all of their 
elements are pagan (Bonefoy 1993; 253). The legitimacy of these claims has 
been contested and has led to a conflict between Balkan ethnic groups over 
the location of a historical homeland (Kelley, 2012; 7). 
Parallel to the enforcement of their claims of Illyrian non-Slavic identity 
(18th and 19th century), during the 1900s and onwards Albanians altered 
their links with the Ottoman past. Ottoman words were thrown out from 
the Albanian language dictionaries and those Albanian-born Grand 
Viziers11 and other important officials who ruled the Ottoman Empire went 
unmentioned in the Albanian official historical records. In addition, history 
textbooks started reading that the Ottoman period of Albanian history was 
dominated by violence. Heated debates went on recently when the Turkish 
government requested Albania and Kosovo to make certain interventions 
and remove inappropriate words that describe the Ottomans. As for 
instance, in a 12th grade history textbook, the phrase “stirred hatred 
                                                 
10 Michele Belledi, Estella S. Poloni, Rosa Casalotti, Franco Conterio, Ilia Mikerezi, James 
Tagliavini and Laurent Excoffier. ‘Maternal and paternal lineages in Albania and the 
genetic structure of Indo-European populations’. European Journal of Human Genetics, July 
2000, Volume 8, Number 7, pp. 480-486. ’Mitochondrial DNA HV1 sequences and Y 
chromosome haplotypes (DYS19 STR and YAP) were characterized in an Albanian sample 
and compared with those of several other Indo-European populations from the European 
continent. No significant difference was observed between Albanians and most other 
Europeans, despite the fact that Albanians are clearly different from all other Indo-
Europeans linguistically. We observe a general lack of genetic structure among Indo-
European populations for both maternal and paternal polymorphisms, as well as low 
levels of correlation between linguistics and genetics, even though slightly more 
significant for the Y chromosome than for mtDNA. Altogether, our results show that the 
linguistic structure of continental Indo-European populations is not reflected in the 
variability of the mitochondrial and Y chromosome markers. This discrepancy could be 
due to very recent differentiation of Indo-European populations in Europe and/or 
substantial amounts of gene flow among these populations.’ 
11 In the Ottoman Empire, the Grand Vizier was the Prime Minister of the Ottoman Sultan, 
with absolute power of attorney and, in principle, dismissible only by the Sultan himself. 
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against the Ottoman rule” from page 48 is suggested to be replaced with 
“caused dissatisfaction with the Ottoman rule,” etc. (Gashi, 2015; 2). 
Tirana-based sociologist Enis Sulstarova highlights that, sometimes, due 
to the tendencies of being positioned as the Illyrians, as well as being listed 
as one of the “Westernized” nations, many Albanian intellectuals and 
politicians emphasize Albanian early conversion to Christianity, dubbing it 
a “true religion of Albanians” or the “religion of forefathers” (Sulstarova, 
2012). Sulstarova also justifies this approach by saying that “creating a 
Western identity was a matter of survival for Albanian elites in the late 19 
century” (Sulstarova, 2006; 9). Such history-telling started during the 19th 
century as part of nation-building process known as the “national revival” 
which portrayed the Ottomans as enemies of Albanians. But, the practice of 
considering the legacy of Ottoman Empire as responsible for almost every 
economic, cultural or political issue that the Albanians encountered 
throughout their history continued during the entire 20th century to the 
present.  
It is position of this research paper that there are also other reasons that 
impacted the survival of tendency to dismiss the legacy of the Ottoman 
past. First, people might find it easier to blame the Ottomans for today’s 
problems by appealing “if the Ottomans did not invade us, we would have 
been a developed Western nation today.” This could also be considered as 
a sort of nesting Balkanism of Albanians vis-à-vis the Ottomans. Second, 
there is a fact that political elites that ruled Albania after the First and 
Second World Wars, King Ahmet Zogu (1928-1939) and Communist leader 
Enver Hoxha (1945-1985), were brought to power with the initial agreement 
and blessing of Serbia. Thus, these Albanian rulers needed someone to 
blame, surely not Serbia, for the fact that their political agreements with the 
“real enemy” made Albania one of the few states in Europe that left half of 
its nation out of its borders (Hetemi, 2012). Another reason that should be 
considered as an important factor that caused these anti-Ottoman 
approaches toward history and national mentality, especially during the 
Communism which in itself has a revisionist character, was simply that the 
official ideology dictated that any reality created by a foreign rule must 
always be considered as dark and hated. Even though the communication 
between Albania and Yugoslavia was difficult, also for Albanians, still 
ethnic Albanians living in Yugoslavia were very much impacted by 
Albania’s approach toward national, historical and, identity definitions and 
approaches. It is mainly because the impact that the Albanian language 
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literature produced and shaped in Albania had in the other Albanians who 
were living outside of its borders. 
However, there are ongoing debates in the Albanian society about the 
necessity to re-interpret, change or improve historic materials from which 
the Albanian pupils and students learn history in schools and at the 
universities (Hetemi, March 2013). Dritan Egro, Ottoman era historian at 
Albania’s Institute of History in Tirana, highlights for the Balkan Insight 
journal that this “softening” towards the Ottomans is a result of a more 
sophisticated approach to social sciences combined with a renewed general 
curiosity about the period.12 All these circumstances and tendencies to hide 
or ignore four centuries of history lead us toward the reasonable 
enthusiasm to believe that, so far, the history was a lesson Albanians were 
taught the wrong way (Hetemi, Sep 2013). Other intellectuals also agree that 
Albanian historical records were influenced by nationalistic propaganda 
during the 19th century “national revival” and the Communist regime 
during the second half of the 20th century (Zimeri & Sadiku 2014). As such, 
there is an immediate need to redesign these schoolbooks with proper 
unbiased historical approaches, based on clear historical research.  
Another element that made Albanians “look different” from the others 
living in the Former Yugoslavia was their religious diversity and a strong 
sense of national identity. As opposed to all other nations living in 
Yugoslavia who used the religion as one of the most important 
identification tools, this was not the case among Albanians. It is necessary 
to highlight that I am trying to imply that the religion-based national 
identity of South Slavs was not as strong as the national identity of the 
Albanians. Especially knowing that the nation is not something that 
objectively exists, it makes us of other cultural and political resources, 
religion being one of them, but also language, territory, history. However 
in the case of Albanians the national identity was rather constructed based 
on elements, such; language, territory, history and culture. 
As Gorani puts it “the nation retained the position of a genuine religion 
of Albanians” (Gorani 2012; 279). Bakic-Hayden also highlights that the 
religion did not impact Albanians’ strong sense of national and “non-
Slavic” identity (M. Bakic-Hayden 1995; 926). However, Isa Blumi theorizes 
                                                 
12 Dritan Ego’s interview is available here:  
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/albanians-question-negative-view-of-
ottomans [Last accessed on 07/05/2015] 
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that such an identity was politically mobilized and that it was culturally 
opaque and ideologically fluid prior to the 1912 Balkan Wars. In relation to 
the competition among various state and power structures, be it in the 
shape of a great power intervention or attempts at building new national 
identities, Blumi shows that Ottoman reforms were successful in 
encouraging most subjects of the Empire to commingle local interests with 
the fate of the Empire, meaning that parochial concern for the survival of 
the immediate community, as it transformed over time, was directly linked 
to the survival of the Ottoman state (Blumi, 2011).  
Giving priority to the Albanian – linguistic and ethnic - identity 
presented a reasonable approach, knowing that Albanians were one of the 
communities with the large religious diversity within their nation in the 
Balkans. This research paper supposes that another reason which 
considerably pushed toward giving special emphasis to national, rather 
than religious identity, is the fact that Albanian Muslims were regarded by 
other communities living within Yugoslavia as “Turks,” Albanian 
Orthodox were regarded as “Greeks,” and Albanian Catholics as “Latins” 
until the 20th century, according to the oral sources heard from the older 
generations who lived during the Yugoslav era. Trying to abolish this 
anxiety, unify and strengthen the national identity, Albanian elites choose 
to replace the religious differences with the common national identity that 
was neither Turk, Greek nor Latin.  
 
4.2. Former Yugoslavia South Slavic Majority’s Perception of 
Albanians 
As stated earlier, the multilayered and polyphonic character of 
Orientalism also reflected in how the people living in the Former 
Yugoslavia were viewed by other people in the Former Yugoslavia. Due to 
the conceptions of origins and historical reasons, Albanians were also 
portrayed negatively within Yugoslavia, particularly by the Serbs. 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic Albanians lived mainly in Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Southeastern Serbia and Montenegro. Despite the fact that 1.7 million 
ethnic Albanians were accounted for in the 1981 census (Stankovic, 1982) 
and that they exceeded the number of Macedonians and Montenegrins in 
the then-Yugoslavia, they were not recognized as one of the “nationalities” 
under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia13 because, according to the Yugoslav government, their 
traditional homeland was outside Yugoslavia.  
Under the First and the Second Yugoslavia or almost until the 1970s, 
Albanians were one of the most discriminated and backward nation with 
high illiteracy rates in the Former Yugoslavia. As such, they enjoyed no 
voice in local administration, had no schools and no publications in their 
language. For example, despite the fact that Kosovo Albanians 
outnumbered them, the Serbs and Montenegrins dominated the 
administration of Kosovo. The Albanian people remained the most 
discriminated population and in dealing with them Miranda Vickers 
blames the regime for extreme measures which, at times, differed just a 
little from those used by the occupation forces during the wars (Vickers 
1998; 148). In addition, Noel Malcolm highlights that the ethnic conflict in 
Kosovo is less a battle over bloodlines and religion than it is one over 
differing conceptions of national origins and history (Malcolm, 1998). From 
Serbian perspective, the Albanians from Kosovo were experiencing an 
Islamic revival, as illustrated by the popular media in Serbia: 
[...] the truth about Kosovo and Metohia has not changed much over 
time, so that even today Muslim fundamentalism, persistently knocking at 
the door of Kosovo and Metohia, is trying to approach Europe. It is hard to 
believe that Europe is not aware of this. Even those in Europe who do not 
hold Serbia close to their hearts know very well that this old Balkan state 
represents the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam 
(Saric 1990; 67-69). 
Prishtina based academic Pajazit Nushi states in his book “Truths on 
Kosova” that the genocide of the Serbian authorities against Albanians 
living in Yugoslavia was led with the aim of the Serbian regime toward 
Albanian teritoriess. After the First World War, the Serbian government 
made repeated attempts to colonize Kosovo with the families of its officer 
corps. According to Nushi, the genocide toward the Albanians originates in 
Serbian historical treatises “Naçertanije” which document experiences of 
the Serbian army in 1878, 1913, 1937, 1945, the works of Serbian scientists 
and writers (Jovan Cvijić, Vasa Ćubrilović, Ivo Andrić, etc), and the 
activities of Serbian cultural and scientist institutions (Serbian Cultural 
                                                 
13 The Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, 21 February 1974, is 
available at the archive of Yugoslavia online: 
http://www.arhivyu.gov.rs/active/en/home/glavna_navigacija/leksikon_jugoslavije/k
onstitutivni_akti_jugoslavije/ustav_sfrj_1974.html [Last accessed on 07/05/2015] 
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Club, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Associations of Writers of 
Serbia, Serbian Orthodox Church) (Stavileci & Nushi, 2000; 136). It is worth 
mentioning that during the decades preceding the Serbian war against 
Kosovo, even the state media played and deployed negative and revisionist 
energy of the said works through hate speeches.  
However, Đorđe Stefanović, in his reaction entitled “Seeing the 
Albanians through Serbian Eyes,” also highlights that the rise of the 
modern national states in the post-Ottoman Balkans was accompanied by 
coercive assimilation, deportation and even extermination of ethnic 
minorities, especially the local Muslims who were seen as former 
oppressors. Stefanović concludes that ethnic Albanians were repeatedly 
subjected to most exclusionary and discriminatory policies in the formative 
periods of the Serbian state and Former Yugoslavia. While these actions of 
the Serbian elite were guided by the geopolitical security pressures and the 
coercive utopia of homogeneous nation-state, Serbian policy makers were 
also influenced by a strong intellectual tradition of intolerance towards 
Muslim Albanians. Hence, some members of the Serbian elite were 
planning and implementing repression and expulsion of Albanians 
(Stefanović, 2005). Also, various sources estimate that, during the period 
between 1944 and 1946, over 36,000 and maybe as many as 47,000 
Albanians were the victims of systematic mass executions by Communists 
during the days of revolutionary fervor and, later, through “search and 
destroy missions,” “pacification,” “disarming,” and “rehabilitation 
programs,” police torture and epidemics of typhoid fever affecting military 
units.14 All these discriminatory measures that lasted for decades, 
obviously caused backwardness of the local Kosovo Albanian population: 
four waves of immigration from Kosovo took place only since 1960s and 
onwards15 which obviously strengthened Kosovo diaspora, but weakened 
                                                 
14 These sources include: S. Repishti, “Human Rights and the Albanian Nationality in 
Yugoslavia,” in Oskar Gruenwald and Karen Rosenblum-Cale (eds), Human Rights in 
Yugoslavia, New York, 1986, p. 238. Several Albanians who had been participants in the 
signing of the Bujan Resolution in 1944 paid with their lives for the ideal of the unification 
of Kosovo and Albania. Rifat Berisha died fighting in the hills of Drenica in 1948 and 
Xheladin Hana was murdered by the UDBA (Yugoslav State Security Service) in 1948. 
Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948- 1974, p. 25. 
15 Literature on Kosovo migration (Riinvest 2007; Vathi & Black, 2007; ESI, 2006; IOM, 2004) 
distinguishes four emigration waves in Kosovo since 1960s and onwards: 1. Late 1960s - 
early 1970s: Unskilled young men with little education from rural Kosovo emigrate to 
Germany and Switzerland as guest workers. 2.Beginig of 1989 - 1997: Kosovo’s autonomy 
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local population.16 However, it’s worth highlighting that the discriminatory 
politics are one reason for migration, but also more banal socio-economic 
reasons played a role. 
These continuous violations of human rights against Albanians living in 
the Former Yugoslavia and its backlash consisting in significant brain drain 
from Kosovo were only stopped with the Western political and, finally, 
military intervention. The interest of Western powers (mainly USA) toward 
the Albanians living in the Former Yugoslavia increased particularly when 
inter-ethnic tensions continued to worsen in Yugoslavia throughout the 
1980s (Rogel, 2003; 167). Long lasting ethnic tensions between 
Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb populations left Kosovo ethnically 
divided, resulting in inter-ethnic violence, including the Kosovo War of 
1999 (Albrecht 2001; 20). 
Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006), Kosovo Albanian political leader, scholar, 
and a writer was a figure who most contributed toward the factorization of 
Albanians of Yugoslavia in the West. Through building strong relations 
with the USA, in particular, as well as some of the most powerful European 
countries, he managed to gain the sympathy of the Western powers as well 
as increase their attention to the Albanians living in the Former Yugoslavia. 
                                                                                                                            
is abolished, and a mass dismissal of Kosovan Albanians from their jobs follows. More 
skilled and better educated young men from both rural and urban areas migrate to 
Western European countries to find jobs and escape the Yugoslav military service; 3. 
Latest war in Kosovo during 1998-1999 when nearly a million of Kosovan Albanians are 
forcefully displaced from Kosovo during the conflict. This trend reverses immediately 
after the conflict when a massive return of displaced population occurs; 4. Post 1999: As 
political stability is established in Kosovo, the immigration policies in (especially) Western 
European countries are straitened towards Kosovans. The emigration wave mainly 
consists of: a) migration for family reunification purposes; b) illegal migration of unskilled 
and undereducated youth and c) (temporary) legal migration of highly skilled and highly 
educated individuals through study or work arrangements. Source of information; 
KOSOVO REMITTANCE STUDY 2012, July 2012, available at; 
http://www.ks.undp.org/content/dam/kosovo/docs/Remitances/KRS2012_English_85
8929.pdf  [Last accessed on 07/05/2015]  
16 The ethnic Albanians had Yugoslavia's lowest literacy rate: 68.5% individuals over the age 
of ten were able to read in 1979. In 1981 only 178,000 of 1.5 million Albanians in Kosovo 
were employed; one in four of those held nominal bureaucratic positions. Meanwhile, the 
student population of 470,000 was a constant source of political unrest and potentially 
higher unemployment upon graduation. (Sources: The Library of Congress Country 
Studies; CIA World Factbook - Data as of December 1990: 
http://www.photius.com/countries/yugoslavia_former/society/yugoslavia_former_soci
ety_albanians.html) [Last accessed on 07/05/2015]  
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The West’s commitment to stabilize the Albanian situation ended with 
a NATO military intervention.17 With the Western powers support, Kosovo 
Parliament declared independence on 17 February 2008 and has since 
gained diplomatic recognition as a sovereign state by 109 UN member 
states.18 The creation of the state of Kosovo is entirely being attributed to 
the Western powers, mainly US, which supported this process throughout.  
The Preshevo Valley, which is situated in Southern Serbia and bordering 
with Macedonia and Kosovo, is home to Serbia’s Albanian minority that 
remained in Serbia.19 Following the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, the 
Preshevo Valley gained international attention mostly due to the Albanian 
revolt from the year 2000 which was also a key factor of destabilization of 
Macedonia in 2001 due to the uprisings of the Albanians living in this 
former Yugoslav republic. Although the situation in the Preshevo Valley 
has been calm in the last few years and the resurgence of armed conflict is 
presently unlikely, the situation is still fragile and continues to pose a 
potential security threat for the wider region (Huszka, 2007). Western 
powers also intervened to calm the conflict raised between February and 
August 2001 between the Government of Macedonia and ethnic Albanians 
living in this country. This war ended with the intervention of 
a NATO ceasefire monitoring force. Under the terms of the Ohrid 
Agreement, the government agreed to devolve greater political power and 
cultural recognition to the Albanian minority (Brunnbauer, 2002). 
Beside these signed agreements and interventions mainly by the 
Westerners, Pettifer and Vikers consider that the Albanian question is not 
yet resolved in the countries that arose from the Former Yugoslavia 
(Pettifer, Vickers 2009). However, the changes occurring in Former Yugoslav 
                                                 
17 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) website is accessible at:  
http://www.nato.int/  [Last accessed on 07/05/2015]  
18 List of the states that recognized the independence of Kosovo:  
http://kosova.org/post/Lista-e-shteteve-qe-kan-pranuar-pavaresine-e-Kosoves[Last 
accessed on 07/05/2015]  
19 An estimate of 60,000-80,000 Albanians live in Serbia out of whom majority live in the 
municipalities of Preševo (Albanian: Preshevë), Bujanovac (Albanian: Bujanoc), and part of 
the municipality of Medveđa (Albanian: Medvegjë). According to the results of the 2002 
Census, there are 61,467 Albanians in Serbia. However, in 2011, most Albanians boycotted 
the Census, which resulted in records of 5,809 Albanians living in Serbia. Source of 
information: Article on Balkans Insight entitled “South Serbia Albanians Seek Community 
of Municipalities”: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/south-serbia-albanians-
request-community-of-municipalities [Last accessed on 07/05/2015] 
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republics can be considered positive in terms of granting ethnic Albanians 
better political rights and representation. 
 
5. Instead of Conclusions 
 
It has been shown in the first part of this paper that the Orientalism and 
Balkanism discourses in the context of the Former Yugoslavia produced 
Western stereotypes. They are particularly noticed in the lenses travelers 
chose to wear while presenting the Balkans which became “the other,” 
insecure, plagued by old hatreds, and inferior, as compared to Western 
Europe which was presented as in position to enlighten, advise, and 
provide reason. It is only natural the Former Yugoslavs would not want to 
be associated with anything negative and considered their Western 
counterparts as the source of reference for “modernization” and 
“progress.” As a result, each Former Yugoslav people’s national elites in 
the Balkans underestimated their own value and required their 
communities to resemble the West during the processes of modernization 
in the 18th and 19th century. This process of “Westernization” involved the 
immediate exercise of their subjects' “de-orientalisation,” as each people’s 
“Westernness” could only have been measured through its “non-
easternness.” Thus, all the peoples living in Former Yugoslavia constantly 
tried to distance themselves from “Orientalism” as well as “Balkanism,” 
and tried to be seen as European as possible. These tendencies produced 
tensions among the populations living within Former Yugoslavia, which 
were mainly provoked due to their competitiveness to present themselves 
as less Oriental and more Western.  
This included Albanians, case study group addressed in this paper. 
Albanians willingly decided to accept the submission to the image others 
have of them as a price to pay for an image of a civilized and pro-Western 
nation that has to do nothing with the East. Tending to refer to their pre-
Christian lineages and building Illyrian identity based on mythological 
sources, they ignored the first handwritten historical sources and altered 
their links with the Ottoman past. Politically, Albanian Western orientation 
helped them gain the Western powers' attention and sympathy. They 
benefited a lot from this support, particularly during the last two decades, 
because it led to granting ethnic Albanians better political rights and 
representation in the region and facilitated Kosovo Albanians to gain 
independent state. Culturally, Albanians became victims of lessons of the 
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wrong history and lived pretending to be “more Catholics than the Pope” 
because they willingly denied a long and important segment of their 
history. 
This research paper shall conclude that, particularly during the last two 
centuries, the Balkans continues to be the region of political and ideological 
experiments and a place of memory for the failures of local and 
international attempts to build societies according to civic paradigms. This 
is so because the Balkans, place that has no history of original political 
thought, place that never cleared up its present day opinion on its Ottoman 
and Yugoslavian past, has never been given chance to give its own 
definition of civility, neighborly relations and socially accepted, like the 
West. 
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